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The term ‘neoliberalism’ is frequently used in contemporary political discussions, but while
polemically eﬀective, conceptually it lacks rigour. Simon Glendinning writes on the relationship
between the concept and classical liberalism. He argues that by deﬁning neoliberalism in terms of
this relationship it becomes apparent that there can be more than one form of neoliberalism, and
that we now live in an era in which a distinctively economic variation holds the ﬁeld. Tracing
European history in terms of a sequence of diﬀerent neoliberal hegemonies, he considers the
possibility of a development beyond the present neoliberal condition.
In a lecture delivered in Vienna in 1935, the German philosopher Edmund Husserl expressed an anxiety concerning
the contemporary predicament of European humanity in the times of science. Despite, and indeed in view of, the
undeniable progress in the natural sciences, Europeans were becoming increasingly resistant to a sense of history
in terms of which “historical occurrence”, especially Europe’s own, might be regarded as something other than it
was then appearing – something other than an “unending concatentation of illusory progress”. Before saying
something further about this predicament, I want ﬁrst to pick up on the major assumption in his discussion: namely,
that overcoming this predicament requires recovering “a teleological sense” of the history of “man”.
Although I do not really think it is restricted to political liberalism, for reasons that will emerge, I will call the sense of
history that Husserl regards as being lost to Europe in the times of science as one belonging to classical liberalism.
Such liberalism draws on this sense of history in what can be described as a three step response to the question of
human ﬂourishing.
First step: a satisfactory account of the conditions for human ﬂourishing must acknowledge the variety of rational
interests, interests which are, that is to say, uniquely characteristic of “man” conceived as a rational animal: science,
art, commerce, politics, religion, etc. With this variety in view, classical liberal political thought aims to optimise
opportunities for free performance in diﬀerent and relatively autonomous domains of human life connected to the
diﬀerent interests of human reason.
Second step: just power should aim to organise the social world in such a way that each person’s capacity freely to
perform in each of these domains is optimised. The ambition of liberalism is thus to organise society in such a way
that it can oﬀer its citizens as great an opportunity as possible to pursue their own life projects.
Third step: human history, and especially the history of Europe, is the movement of increasing progress in realising
such a society; human history, and especially the history of Europe, is the movement of the emancipation and
progress of “man” in time: from its origins in primitive human animality, human societies are moving in stages
towards the optimal realisation of man’s rational capacities in a properly civilised society, with Europe at the head.
Husserl’s remarks about the predicament of modern European humanity, humanity in the times of science, suggest
that what I am calling the classical liberal view is in crisis. Suddenly the movement of our history seems not to be
taking the path we thought we were on. History seems no longer a sequence of increasingly just spiritual worlds but
a random series of worlds that, as Husserl put it, “form and dissolve themselves like ﬂeeting waves”.
I want to propose the following hypothesis. Hegemonic conceptions of human ﬂourishing in Europe have rarely been
classically liberal. Instead, hegemonic power has been established and held by more than one neoliberal
community of ideas.
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The thought here is that eﬀorts to optimise opportunities for leading a life proper to “man” have given rise to
movements that attempt to achieve the hegemonic domination of the norms that belong to only one of the domains
of human life. Those who belong to the community of ideas which represents or defends the interests of one of the
domains of life attempt to take charge of the whole.
I deﬁne neoliberalism in general, then, as the outlook of a community of ideas that seeks the limitless extension of
the norms of conduct of one domain of life to the whole of life. Its emancipatory claim is that it will achieve the
optimal ﬂourishing of the whole of life by co-ordinating and controlling it in terms dictated by the norms of that one
domain. The guiding assumption of every neoliberal community of ideas is that human ﬂourishing in life in general
requires that one particular domain of life should rule.
Anachronisms are piling up. The liberal conception I am describing will have only recently taken that name, and the
term neoliberalism is of even more recent vintage, and passes for many today as a kind of catch-all for ‘everything
bad about capitalism’. However, conceptually speaking the two terms together are well suited for this discussion,
particularly if we accept that behind the various appeals to the idea of neoliberalism made today, there is a basic
conception of it as a hegemonic movement that seeks the limitless extension of the market model to all spheres of
life. Neoliberalism in our time is, that is to say, understood as an economic neoliberalism. It is construed as an
ideological conception that says every problem has a market solution or a solution within the logic of the market.
Proponents of it might say: the aim of applying market-orientated reasoning everywhere is to optimise the conditions
for human ﬂourishing in general.
However, there is a feature of our time that Husserl is alive to that fundamentally interrupts this a-historical
conceptual contrast between classical liberalism and economic neoliberalism, and it is a feature that can make one
feel altogether despairing: namely, the absence in our time (unless we are Marxists) of the kind of substantive
philosophy of history through which the classical liberal conception, in its third step, had understood our lives.
We live in a time which has more or less abandoned such grand historical narratives of world history. The idea of the
history of the world as the progressive emancipation and progress of “man” is simply no longer credible. And this is
profoundly connected to the progress of science itself: in particular through the radically decentring blows eﬀected by
the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions. In our time, we are more resistant than Europeans of former times knew
how to be to theological (eschatological) or metaphysical (teleological) conceptions of human nature and history.
In such a time, the classic interest in emancipation and progress seems unable to get any purchase beyond
attempts at making the life-support system of our economies function in ever more productive ways: of improving
their eﬃciency, and seeking their optimisation, with no higher end than improving their functioning.
In other words, into the space left open by the falling away of classic eschatological and teleological discourses of
human ﬂourishing – in the anachronistic terms of the account I am giving here from the religious neoliberalism of
medieval Europe, through the political neoliberalism of Europe’s modernity – the community of ideas that champions
economic neoliberalism and its criteria of optimal eﬃciency and performativity has been able to occupy the ﬁeld
virtually unchallenged. But, as Husserl anticipates, it all seems despairingly hopeless, making our existence
fundamentally pointless, tragically meaningless.
It doesn’t look good. But the situation only seems despairing if, with Husserl, you think that the only way our lives
could be regarded as meaningful is against the background of the thought that world history follows an
eschatological or teleological path, programme or design (whether of God, nature or man). Husserl thinks we cannot
ﬁnd consolation in anything short of such a background.
The dominant European understanding of Europe’s “entry into modernity”, an understanding that Husserl more or
less embraces, centrally involves this kind of vision of human history: of history as the progressive movement of our
forms of social life towards distant, ideally just, ideals. But one does not have to have such a vision in view to aﬃrm
that making the future better matters to us: one can simply want to make it so that what one makes of what has been
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passed down to us will have been some kind of (by one’s lights) progressive preface to what remains to come,
without any vision of a distant ﬁnal end.
This can be illustrated with reference to the unease that many feel about modern factory farming, intensive livestock
rearing, the general spoliation of nature, and the extinction of innumerable animal species. Without presuming a
substantive conception of human nature or history, the unease is that these developments show us modern men
and women, as in a mirror, as at certain points akin to a form of life we might well think profoundly alien: akin, that is,
to an animal with, as David Wiggins has put it, “no non-instrumental concerns and no interest in the world
considered as lasting longer than the animal in question will need the world to last in order to sustain the animal’s
own life”.
Such a life, “functioning” to such a destructive end, is not just depressing but runs totally against the grain of a
participant’s sense that the temporal “here and now” of an ordinary human life is one in which “the dead and the
unborn are also present”. The world in which we live out our lives is one which “connects us to worlds before and
after us”. Our lives, our lived sense of who we are, is conceived out of and within that temporal stretch. “Functioning
to no end” might describe, in objective terms, the infrastructure of a presently operational life-support system, but
from the inside of a human life this “presence”, the milieu of our “spiritual worlds”, is already a “present” that is
fundamentally linked to those who are not there.
Jacques Derrida has argued that it is only within this participatory sense of the deep connectedness of our “living
present” to others who are not present (the essential historicity of our historical existence), and not in view of a
distant horizon of an ideal end of history, that issues of justice, emancipation and progress can come into view in the
ﬁrst place:
It is in the name of justice that it is necessary to speak about ghosts, inheritance, and generations,
generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living…
No ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does
not recognise in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who
are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born. No justice seems
possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, before the
ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead.
In the struggle to organise a response to economic neoliberalism today we may be inclined to think, like Husserl in
the 1930s, that we need to rediscover a teleological sense of human history – a new grasp of and heading towards
a form of social life that is ﬁnally (and objectively) proper to “man”. Emerging out of the Christian eschatological
tradition and its hope for ﬁnal redemption, political neoliberalism aimed to realise regimes without evil by forging a
community of brothers, citizens, or comrades that would ﬁnally be, in a strong sense, one. Economic neoliberalism
arrives in the wake of that dream’s ending in the horror of Stalinism and Nazism. However, as the site of (let’s not
say an atheist but) an atheologised recognition of “the ﬁnitude of present functioning”, it also frees the space for a
radically decentred, non-mystical and non-metaphysical, participatory vision of that ﬁnite presence. Derrida
concludes:
In the same place, on the same limit, where history is ﬁnished, there where a certain determined
concept of history comes to an end, precisely there the historicity of history begins, there ﬁnally it has
the chance of heralding itself – of promising itself. There where man, a certain determined concept of
man, is ﬁnished, there the pure humanity of man, of the other man and of man as other begins or has
ﬁnally the chance of heralding itself – of promising itself.
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Note: This article is based on a longer LSE ‘Europe in Question’ discussion paper. The article gives the views of
the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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